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PUJBLIC ExposuRE OF THE FEMALE BREAST:

OBSCENE AND IMMORAL OR FREE AND EQUAL?
Helen Pundurs*

Deep in her breastlies the silent wound.

Virgil
Ecologues 1.67
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1986, a crowd estimated to be between one to
four hundred people gathered to witness a demonstration at Cobbs
Hill Park in Rochester, New York. In front of television cameras,
friendly supporters, curious onlookers, and prurient hecklers, a group
of women removed their shirts. They bared their breasts to protest the
statutory illegality of such disclosure, and claimed their right to
appear in public in the same way that men are permitted to appear.
According to New York State law, a person may not expose the
private or intimate parts of his or her body in a public place,' and the
law defines the private or intimate parts of a woman's body as
including the "portion of the breast which is below the top of the
areola."2 The only exceptions to this rule are when one is either

*The author is ajoint degree candidate (J.D., M.S.W. expected May, 1995) at
the University at Buffalo School of Law.
I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1984).
2Id.
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breast-feeding an infant or performing in a play, exhibition, show, or
3
entertainment.
Chanting "Not the church, not the state, women will control
our fate," and "Whatever we wear and wherever we go, yes means yes
and no means no," supporters carried signs which read "Suppression
Creates Obsession," "Not Obscene," "Gender Discrimination,"
"Breasts Are Beautiful," "What Is Indecent About Our Breasts?,"
Top-FreeEquality," "Don't Bust MyBust," and "Keep YourLaws Off
Our Bodies."' Some supporters of the demonstrators wore t-shirts
bearing an image of a topfree Statue of Liberty with the words,
"Equal Rights Now - Shirtless Equality in 1986." People in the
gathered crowd engaged in discussions with the demonstration
participants, while a local radio station offered free concert tickets to
any women who would actively join in the demonstration.5 The only
disturbance that occurred among the crowd involved a man who
exposed his genitals to some women.6 Shortly after the women
removed their shirts, the police arrived and ordered them to put their
shirts back on. The women who defied this order, dubbed the
"Topfree Seven" by one member of the group, were arrested despite
the fact that no complaints had been received by the local authorities.
The District Attorney pursued the case, and its ultimate
disposition took place six years later when, in People v. Santorelli,7
the New York State Court of Appeals dismissed the charges. The
result is undoubtedly clear as to the parties involved; the Topfree
Seven are no longer being prosecuted. However, the practical and

3

Id-

'

Defendant Mary-Lou Schloss's Memorandum of Law in support of Motion

to Dismiss at 22, People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Rochester City Ct. 1986)
(No. CR-1527-86).
5 David Annon, U.P.I.,

June 22, 1986, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,

Wires File.

'

People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
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constitutional implications of the decision are anything but clear. The
Court's decision leaves a number of questions unanswered, and
creates still more. May women now remove their shirts in any public
place without fear of criminal sanctions? Or, are they confined to
recreational areas, such as beaches and parks?8 If the former is true,
will women actually exercise this right? If not, why not? If the latter
is true, can a constitutional right exist only on the beach or in a park?
Finally, in light of the numerous other problems particular to women,
(such as the erosion of reproductive rights, continuing pay inequality,
sexual harassment, rape, and domestic violence, to name a few) is this
an issue sufficiently significant to warrant detailed consideration?
This article addresses these issues while examining the
societal framework from which they arise.9 It is the societal context
which does not merely influence, but rather completely constructs the
way that the female breast has been regarded legislatively and
judicially. As a result, the definition of the female breast as a private
or intimate part of the body, and its public exposure as "obscene"
under the law, continues despite the harm such a definition creates
and perpetuates. The harm created by the myth of the obscene female
breast is two-fold. First, it causes individual physical and
psychological damage to some women, who have been denied the
direct visual experience of vastly differing breast sizes, shapes and
conditions, and regard their own breasts as inadequate and requiring
either concealment or surgical correction and augmentation. Second,
the myth serves to support the continuous violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of any woman who wishes to be

' The effect of the decision is yet to be tested or clarified, except for an
internal memo issued by the New York State Attorney General's Office to the
Parks Department, to help guide policy decisions regarding state-owned beaches.
It states that while "Llt seems unlikely that the Court [of Appeals] would uphold

an absolute prohibition by your Office of exposure of the female breast in all
circumstances ...
it may not preclude an alternative such as designation of certain
topless areas." Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. Op. No. F92-3, 11 (Aug. 4, 1992).
' The issue of topfree equality will be considered as separate and distinct
from the issues surrounding completely nude sunbathing, or the so-called
"Naturist" lifestyle. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
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topfree. If traditional constitutional guidelines and standards were
applied in light of facts, rather than antiquated cultural constructs,
topfree equality would be permissible, and these two types of harm
would be significantly reduced, if not eradicated.

H. BREASTS IN THE COURTROOM
Three months after the demonstration, the case came to trial
in Rochester City Court. The court agreed with only one of the
arguments raised by the seven defendants."0 The defendants argued
that § 245.01, "Exposure of a person,"" violated equal protection and
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
protection of free speech under the First Amendment, as well as
unspecified penumbral rights under the Ninth Amendment. 2 While
City Court Judge Herman J. Walz rejected the equal protection and
due process claims, he found that the defendants' First Amendment
rights had been violated and dismissed the charges. 13 On appeal to
the Monroe County Court, the dismissal was reversed, based on the
Court's decision that the State's regulation of bodily exposure is
substantially related to the important government interest of
protecting public sensibilities, and does not impermissibly infringe
upon freedom of expression.' 4
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the charges were
again dismissed, but for entirely different reasons than those which

10 People v.

Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Rochester City Ct. 1986), rev'd 564
N.Y.S.2d 695 (Monroe County CL 1989), rev'dsub nom. People v. Santorelli,
600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
1N.Y. PENALLAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1984).
12

People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, at 1007.

"

Id. at 1008.

People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Monroe County Ct. 1989), rev'd sub
nom. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
14
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supported the trial court's decision. In an opinion that was brief in
length and terse in tone, the majority held that the statute simply did
not apply to the facts.15 According to state law, the courts must
construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality, if a reasonable
basis can be found to do so. 16 The court relied upon the original
legislative purpose behind § 245.01, discouraging topless
waitressing, 7 as a reasonable basis to uphold the law. Accordingly,
the charges were dismissed because the law did not apply to the facts
in this case.
8
The majority also referred to an earlier case, People v. Price,"
in which charges of indecent public exposure were dismissed against
a woman who was arrested for wearing a fishnet top through which
portions of her areola were visible. The court held that the statute
"should not be applied to the noncommercial, perhaps accidental, and
certainly not lewd, exposure alleged,"19 and rested its decision on the
grounds that the the original legislative purpose of § 245.01 was to
discourage topless waitresses. This original version of the law was
entitled "Exposure of a female" and prohibited the exposure of a
female's breasts, but made no mention of her genital area. Strictly
construed, the original version of the statute allowed women to
appear in public without pants or skirts, but required that their breasts
remain covered.
The legislative purpose of the current version of the statute is
no longer confined to discouraging topless waitressing. Protecting
parents and children from the discomfort caused by unwelcome
public nudity while using public beaches is the legislative intent

15

People v. Santorelli, 600 N.B.2d at 234.

16

N.Y. STATUTES § 150(e) (MeKiMnney 1972).

17People v. Santorelli, 600 N.B.2d at 233.

,1307 N.E.2d 46 (N.Y. 1979).
19 Id. at 46.
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behind the most recent version of the law?2 Therefore, the Court of
Appeals' reliance on the original but superseded legislative purpose
of § 245.01 is misplaced.
In relying upon the earlier version and original purpose of
§ 245.01 instead of what is currently in force, the Santorellimajority
managed to avoid addressing the constitutional questions before
them. In a concurring opinion, Judge Vito Titone was quick to
identify this shortcoming in an opinion that was considerably more
detailed than that of the majority. He characterized the majority
opinion as attempting to bypass" or short-circuit?' the defendants'
equal protection claims, and as "nothing more than an artful means of
avoiding a confrontation with an important constitutional problem."'
Judge Titone further observed that the majority's reliance on Price
was misplaced, because the statute had been updated. The current
version was enacted in 1983 with the explicit purpose of protecting
families who use public recreational areas from unwelcome public
nudit thereby rendering the earlier purpose of § 245.01 (to
discourage topless waitresses)' inapplicable and irrelevant to
Santorelli.
The concurring opinion examined the appellants' Fourteenth
Amendment claims in detail using the established constitutional
standard of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications. This
standard provides that when a statute creates a classification based on
gender, the state has the burden of showing that the classification is
substantially related to the achievement of an important government
" Sponsor's Mem. re: Assembly Bill A5638, Bill Jacket, L.1983, ch. 216;
Letter dated May 31, 1983 from Assembly Member G.E. Lipschutz to Governor
Cuomo re: Assembly Bill A5638 [hereineafter Bill Jacket].
21

People v Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 234 (Titone, J., concurring).

22

Id

23

Id at235.

24

Bill Jacket, supranote 20.

25 Price, 307 N.E.2d at 46.
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interest 6 The prosecution did not advance any rationale for the
distinction, but the concurrence identified it as the "assumption that
the sight of a female's uncovered breast in a public place is offensive
to the average person in a way that the sight of a male's uncovered
breast is not."2I
In applying the prescribed intermediate level of scrutiny, the
concurring judges found that while the protection of public
sensibilities is generally a legitimate goal for legislation, it does not
justify a legislative classification based on gender. The analysis
which followed concluded that § 245.01 is unconstitutional on its
face. In reaching this conclusion, the concurrence recognized that the
perception of the female breast is a "suspect cultural artifact rooted in
centuries of prejudice and bias towards women" 29 and noted the
expert testimony at trial which. "suggested that the enforced
concealment of women's breasts reinforces cultural obsession with
them, contributes towards unhealthy attitudes about breasts by both
sexes and even discourages women from breast-feeding their
children."30 These findings were consistent with the arguments
3
advanced by the defendants at trial. '
At trial, all seven of the defendants testified and each one
presented her reasons for having removed her shirt in public. The
common thread running throughout was the desire for equality and
the perception of the prohibition as sexist and damaging. Each of the
women maintained that not only does § 245.01 infringe upon their
right to equal protection under the law, it also perpetuates the cultural
2

See Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.

380 (1979); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
2

People v Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 236.

28

See People v. Hollman, 500 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1986).

2

People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 237.

31

Id. at 237, n.3.

See generallyRecord on Appeal, People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695
(Monroe County Ct. 1989).
31
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obsession with, and objectification of, the female breast. Along with
expert witnesses, the women testified that this cultural fixation plays
a significant role in the creation of a range of problems, including
violent pornography and violence against women," sexual
harassment,33 abusive intimate relationships,' increased teenage
pregnancy," silicone breast implants,36 inhibition of breastfeeding,37
and diminished self-concept and self-esteem resulting in eating
disorders," depression and suicide.39
The trial record shows varied and colorful exhibits entered
into evidence by the defendants to support their position. Among the
exhibits submitted by the defendants were the February 1986 Sports
Illustrated swimsuit edition, the Rochester Naturist newsletter, a
leaflet entitled "Keep Your Shirt On, Girlie," a press release and
poster prepared in anticipation of the demonstration, a book on
holistic health and healing (Nature's Seven Doctors by H.E. Kushner),
a book called "Bittersweet Revenge" which describes how to
physically restrain and assault women for sexual gratification, a
magazine called "Curiosity Excited the Cat" featuring photographs of
women subjected to violent physical restraints, a Gallup poll of
opinions about nude sunbathing, and a guide to nude beaches
throughout the worldYo The defendants introduced these exhibits to
establish that the statutory proscription against public exposure of
32

. at 239-40.

33

Id. at 201-2.

"

Id. at 408.

31

Id.at 413-14.

36

Id. at 240.

3

Id. at 452, 470,474, 502-03.

31

Id. at 138, 188-89.

39

Id. at 351.

40

Id. at 2B.
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female breasts is an expression of a cultural, societal bias that has no
logical basis in fact and is damaging to women. The defendants
argued that § 245.01 does not advance an important government
interest; rather, it serves to reinforce and perpetuate a cultural climate
which legitimizes denial of equal protection and free expression for
women.

m. TOPFREE AS EQUAL SPEECH
A. Communicative Conduct
In considering the overall scope of the defendants' actions and
the testimony given at trial, it is clear that the women's actions
constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that certain non-verbal conduct
is of sufficient communicative content to merit First Amendment
protection.4 ' To be characterized as expressive, conduct must be
intended to convey a particularized message and a great likelihood
must exist that, given the surrounding circumstances, the message
would be understood by those who view it.4 2
The expressive nature of the defendants' actions was
recognized at trial4 3 and on appeal.'
The demonstration was a
conscious act of civil disobedience and an intentional statement of a
distinct opinion. The night before the demonstration, the group
presented a slide show and informational session, calling attention to

See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down a statute
prohibiting the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized
government); see also Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaningof Symbolic Speech
Underthe FirstAmendment, 21 UCLA L.REV. 29 (1973).
41

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,294
(1984).
4

41

People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 1012-13.

44

People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
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the use of women's bodies in pornography and advertising and the
portrayal of women as passive objects in a culture defined by males.
A statement was prepared in advance and given to the local media.
Signs and banners were carried at the demonstration, declaring its
purpose. Additionally, leaflets were distributed on the day of the
event, stating the demonstration's purpose. The women were
interested in more than merely exercising their rights; they also
declared their right to appear topfree in their community. They were
not making a fashion statement; they were making a political
statement.
Other activities recognized by the courts as speech have
included flag burning,4s the wearing of black armbands, 46 the refusal
to salute the flag in schooll displaying a peace symbol attached to a
privately owned American flag," hanging offensive articles on a
clothesline to protest high taxes,49 and sitting-in a racially segregated
public library.' 0 However, the First Amendment does not afford
absolute protection to all acts which attempt to convey a message,
even if that attempt is successful. Expressive actions which the Court
has refused to protect include burning draft registration cards to
protest the Viet Nam War,"' sleeping outdoors to dramatize the plight
of the homeless,52 and completely nude dancing5 3
s See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4 See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48

See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).

41 People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S.

42(1963).
so

See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).

5' See United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
52

See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

1994-1995

PublicExposure

B. Incidental Limitations on Freedom of Expression
The category of cases which involve expressive conduct
which the state may circumscribe, such as nude dancing, the burning
of draft cards, and sleeping outdoors on public park land, are
particularly useful in analyzing Santorelli. Of particular importance
is the four-prong test established in U.S. v. O'Brien 4 which has been
applied recently in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.'5 In O'Brien, the
Court held that the public destruction of Selective Service
Registration cards as a protest against the Vietnam War was not
protected speech. To reach this conclusion, the Court laid out a four
step test designed to determine whether a government interest is
sufficiently important to justify incidental infringements upon
freedom of expression. It includes the following elements: (1) the
regulation must be within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) the regulation must further an important or substantial government
interest; (3) the government interest must be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4)the incidental restriction must
56
be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
In O'Brien, the Court held that Congress has the power to
conscript manpower for military service (thereby satisfying the first
"constitutionality" prong), and that the administrative functioning of
the conscription process is a legitimate and substantial governmental
interest (which satisfied the second "important interest" prong). The
defendants in O'Brien were convicted for the noncommunicative
impact of their conduct, not for the content being conveyed, (which
fulfilled the third "content neutrality" prong) and their conviction was

54 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

5 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
56

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 377.
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limited to what was necessary to effectuate the government's purpose
(meeting the fourth prong's "narrowly tailored" requirement)., 7
The limitations imposed on the Vietnam War protestors'
freedom of expression were described as incidental because the
restrictions were not aimed at the content of the expression. The
noncommunicative impact for which the defendant was convicted
was the substantial interruption of a valid and important government
interest - the conscription of military forces. O'Brien was not
precluded from expressing opposition to the war in other ways which
would not interrupt the effective administration of the conscription
process. The limitations imposed on free expression were not
intended to suppress opinions, but rather to preserve and protect the
function of the Selective Service Registration cards themselves, as an
integral part of the conscription process. Pursuant to O'Brien,
limitations on freedom of expression that are not aimed at
suppressing the idea itself, but that are necessary to effectuate the
asserted government interest, are characterized as incidental and
therefore constitutional.
After O'Brien, a two-track approach to First Amendment
analysis emerged58 The distinction hinged on the third "content
neutrality" prong of the O'Brien test: whether or not the asserted
government interest is directly related to (that is, seeking to impose
or cause) the suppression of a particular idea or opinion. If an
asserted governmental interest is related to the suppression of free
expression, then the attempted restriction will be held

' The decision in O'Brien has been strongly criticized as "astonishingly
cavalier" of O'Brien's"by no means fivolous" claim. See Dean Alfange, Jr.,
FreeSpeech andSymbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1 (1968). Similarly, the concurring justices in Santorellialleged that
the majority chose not to deal with the complexities of the issue, "made no
attempt to discuss, let alone to answer, the difficult and disturbing constitutional
questions raised." Santorelli,at 604. See also Lawrence P. Velvel, Freedom of
Speech and the Draft CardBurning Cases, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 149 (1968).
58 See GERALD

GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1223-24 (12th ed. 1991);
see also Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 312-13
(1984) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
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unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard. However, if an
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, then the
less stringent O'Brien test constitutes the applicable standard.'
Under O'Brien, limitations of First Amendment freedoms may be
justified if they are merely incidental and comport with the four
requirements.
C. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
Some important curtailments of free speech which have been
upheld include "time, place and manner" restrictions. In Clark v.
Community for Creative Nonviolence'" the National Park Service

refused to permit demonstrators to sleep in tents that had been erected
to call attention to the plight of the homeless. Members of the group
had been permitted to erect the tents on National Park land in
Washington, D.C. but were precluded from actually sleeping in them
because of Park Service regulations which permit camping only in
campgrounds designated for that purpose. In deciding against the
demonstrators, the Court applied the standards enunciated in O'Brien.
The interest asserted by the government was the preservation of
national parks in an attractive and intact condition for use by those
who wish to enjoy them, and this interest was held both constitutional
and important. The regulation was content neutral, and therefore
unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the regulation was
narrowly tailored to its purpose. 61 The Court also described the

" "If the State's regulation is not related to [suppression of] expression, then
the less stringent standard we announced in [O'Brien] for regulations of
noncommunicative conduct controls. If it is, then we are outside of O'Brien's
test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's conviction under a
more demanding standard." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,403.
60 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
61

IL at 295-96.
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regulation as a valid time, place or manner restriction. 62 Such a
restriction is a permissible infringement upon communicative conduct
as long as the restriction is content neutral, effectuates an important
government interest and does not foreclose other channels for
communication of the idea.' Essentially, the time, place and manner
analysis rephrases the O'Brien test, and clearly demonstrates that
content neutrality is essential to upholding restrictions on expression.
The government can tell citizens when, where and how they may say
something, but may not tell citizens what they may say.

D. Baring Breasts and Burning Flags
An example of a government interest that was directly related
64
to the suppression of free expression is found in Texas v. Johnson.
The defendant was arrested for burning an American flag as part of
a political protest outside the 1984 Republic National Convention in
Dallas. Flag-burning was prohibited under a Texas law entitled
Desecration of Venerated Object.' In a highly controversial 5 to 4
decision, the Court held that this activity was protected
communicative conduct. To reach this conclusion, the majority
applied the O'Brienstandard, looking first to whether Texas had an
asserted interest in Johnson's conviction that was unrelated to

62

AL at 297-98.

63 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). In
Heffron, the Court upheld a rule prohibiting the sale or distribution of any
merchandise, including printed or written material, except from booths rented to
all applicants in a non-discriminatory manner, on a first-come, first-served basis.
The rule was challenged by a group of Hare Krishnas, who wished to distribute
information, but had not secured a booth. The asserted state interest was crowd
control.

61 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1968).
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freedom of expression.'
The state had asserted two interests,
"preventing breaches of the peace, and preserving the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity."67 The Court found that the first
interest was not implicated on the record, in that no actual disturbance
of the peace occurred in response to the flag-burning. Additionally,
the Court held that the threat of a potential breach of the peace was
insufficient reason for the suppression of expression, stating "[We]
have not permitted the Government to assume that every expression
of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required
careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such
[expression]."6' The fact that several onlookers testified that they
were offended at such a display was not conclusive as to the risk of
rioting.
The Court found that the State's second asserted interest,
preservation of the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity,
was related to expression of ideas and therefore not an interest that
Texas could legitimately assert:
The State, apparently, is concerned that such
conduct will lead people to believe that either the flag
does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but
instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that
the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist,
that is we do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These
concerns blossom only when a person's treatment of
the flag communicates some message, and thus are
related "to the suppression of free expression" within
the meaning of O'Brien. We are thus outside of
69
O'Brien's test altogether.

6s Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
67 1&

68 Id. at409.
69

Id. at 410.
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The Court went on to consider whether or not the asserted
state interest was justified nevertheless, under a higher standard, "the
most exacting scrutiny." 0 In the course of this analysis, the majority
observed that the defendant had been prosecuted for the expression
of a specific idea - his dissatisfaction with national policies under the
Reagan administration - and because he was aware that such
expression would cause serious offense.71 In light of the fact that
flag-burning is the preferred method of disposing of worn-out flags
under Federal law, and is not an activity contested by Texas, the
Court concluded "[tjhe Texas law is thus not aimed at protecting the
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed
instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious
offense to others."' 2 The Court held that the asserted government
interest did not withstand strict scrutiny, noting that the "bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment... is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
73
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.
Although the asserted government interests are phrased
differently in Johnson and Santorei, they are closely congruent in
their objectives and methodologies. In Johnson, the State's interest
in the preservation of the flag's symbolic content was predicated on
the acceptance of the flag as a symbol of national unity and
effectuated through preventing its public presentation in a manner
that may be contrary to its traditional content. In Santorelli, the
State's interest in the protection of order and morality was predicated
on the acceptance of the female breast as sexual, and effectuated
through preventing the presentation of the female breast in a manner
which is contrary to its traditionally assigned (and legally mandated)
content.

70

Id. at412.

71

Id. at 411-12.

72

Id at411.

73

Id. at 414.
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The distinction between the state interests in Johnson and
Santorelli exists in the focus of the respective legislation. In the
former, the focus is on the object of the communicative transaction,
that which is viewed, the flag. In the latter, the focus is on the subject
of the communicative transaction, the persons who view the female
breast, the general public. At the core of both asserted interests are
public, communicative actions which express controversial content.
The fact that the interest asserted by New York focuses on the
observer while the interest asserted by Texas focuses on the observed
is a meaningless and artificial distinction that has never been relevant
within the context of the First Amendment. No material distinction
exists between an asserted state interest which is phrased as seeking
to protect public sensibilities regarding the expression of a
controversial idea by preventing its public presentation, and one
which is phrased as endeavoring to preserve the content of a given
symbol by protecting the public from viewing it in a non-traditional
manner. If Mr. Johnson had burned his flag in private, he would have
caused no offense; if the Santorelli defendants had appeared topfree
in private, the sensibilities of the public would have remained intact.
Similarly, if either instance of communicative conduct had occurred
in a deserted public space, no offense would have occurred. The
government interest asserted in each instance requires the presence,
and presumes the existence, of an observer. The asserted interests
rest upon the observer's response to the communicative conduct.
Therefore, the distinction between protecting public sensibilities and
preserving the traditional content of a symbol are so closely linked as
to be indistinguishable for purposes of this analysis.
The close similarity between Santorelliand Johnson can be
demonstrated by inserting the relevant concepts from Santorelliinto
two statements taken from Johnson. In rephrasing the Court's
statement regarding the direct relationship of prohibiting flag-burning
to suppression of expression,7 4 it becomes clear that the symbolic
expression of unconventional and critical ideas about government
policies regarding women's bodies is treated differenly than the
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expression of similarly unconventional and critical ideas about other
government policies, or government policies generally:
The State, apparently, is concerned that
[women appearing topfree in public] will lead people
to believe either that the [female breast] does not
stand for [sexual activity] and [maternal nurturing]
but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or
that the concepts reflected in the [female breast] do
not in fact exist, that is, we do not enjoy[the female
breast as sexual and maternal]. These concerns
blossom only when a person's treatment of the [female
breast] commuicates some message, and thus are
related "to the suppression of free expression" within
the meaning of O'Brien.75
Elsewhere in Johnson, the majority also observed,
If we were to hold that a State may forbid
flag-burning wherever it is likely to endanger the
flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning
promotes that role - as where, for example, a person
ceremoniously bums a dirty flag - we would be saying
that when it comes to impairing the flag's physical
integrity, the flag itself may be used as a symbol only
in one direction. We would be permitting a state to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox" by saying that one
may bum the flag to convey one's attitude toward it
and its referents only if one does not endanger the
flag's representation of nationhood and national
76
unity.

75
76

Id. at 407.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415-17.
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If the same principles are applied to the facts in Santorelli,a
logically consistent statement results: If we were to hold that a State
may forbid [exposing the female breast] wherever it is likely to
endanger the [female breast's] role, but allow it wherever [exposing
the female breast] promotes that role- as where, for example, [a
woman bares her breasts to feed her infant child or to perform in
entertainment] we would be saying that when it comes to [exposing]
the [female breast's physical reality] the [female breast] itself may be
used as a symbol only in one direction. We would be permitting a
State to "prescribe what shall be orthodox" by saying that [a woman]
may [expose her breasts] to convey [her] attitude toward [them] and
[their] referents only if [she] does not endanger the [female breasts']
representation of [sexuality and maternity]. 7
The perceived content of the American flag exists only
because it has been culturally defined as representing national unity,
and because persons who view the flag are socialized to recognize
and accept that content. The protection of the symbolic content of the
flag begins with and rests upon the acceptance of that content by
those who view it. Accordingly, the Texas Legislature decided to
protect the flag's symbolic content from attack, and protect the people
of Texas from the offense that such attack may occasion. If nobody
saw the flag as symbolic of national unity, there never would have
been a reason to prevent the expression of a contrary view. Similarly,
the perceived content of the female breast as primarily sexual and
occasionally maternal would not necessitate protection if such
perception were not already firmly established and widely accepted.
Since flag-burning is protected as allowing the use of an object with
socially recognized symbolic content in more than one direction,
topfree public appearances should be protected as well.

77Id.
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E. Order, Morality and the Protection of Public Sensibilities
The difference between cases such as OBrien and Clark,
which upheld limitations on expressive conduct, and cases such as
Johnson,which did not, seems to reside in the asserted state interest.
In cases which upheld the regulation or prohibition of expressive
conduct, the asserted governmental interest usually involved
necessary governmental processes, such as draft conscription, or the
protection and preservation of property owned by the Federal
Government, such as National Park land use regulations. By
comparison, the cases which struck down restrictions or limitations
on free expression typically involved gestures which, though likely to
cause offense, posed no actual threat to the effective functioning of
government or to the preservation of peace. Clearly, exposure of
female breasts in public does not impede government functions, nor
does it incite rioting.
A notable exception to the general trend described above is
particularly useful in analyzing the constitutional protection for
topfree equality. Examining First Amendment claims in a case
specifically involving female nudity demonstrates how female breasts
are culturally regarded, and perhaps gives some insight as to why
exposure of the female breast is treated differently than other
symbolic gestures which do not impede government functions or
threaten the peace. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre,Inc.,7s the Court heard
the First Amendment claims of the Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., and Glen
Theatre, Inc. These two businesses, a bar and a bookstore
respectively, wished to present totally nude dancing, but were
constrained from doing so under an Indiana indecency statute which
required nude dancers to wear pasties"9 and G-strings."' The Court
71501 U.S. 560 (1991).
'9

Pasties are adhesive coverings for nipples, worn by strippers and exotic

dancers. WEBSiE'SNEwWORLDDICIONARY 988 (3d college ed. 1988).
8 A G-string is a narrow cloth or band similar to a loincloth, usually with
spangles or tassles, worn by strippers and exotic dancers. WEBsTER's NmV
WORLD DICrIONARY 598 (3d college ed. 1988).
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held that such restrictions did not violate the First Amendment
because all four prongs of the O'Brien analysis were satisfied. The
Court noted that enacting indecency statutes is clearly within the
constitutional powers of the States and that such statutes further the
substantial government interest in protecting societal order and
morality. A distinction was drawn between the prohibition of nudity
and the prohibition of the erotic message conveyed by dancers, noting
that the use of minimal clothing does not interfere with the erotic
message; "it simply makes the message slightly less graphic. "8'
Thus, the statute was not aimed at suppressing the content; rather, it
sought to regulate the manner of the expression. Lastly, under the
O'Brien analysis, the Indiana statute was found to be narrowly
tailored and therefore justifiable.
Significantly, the government interest underlying the statute
that was validated in Barnes was the protection of order and
morality.'
This implies that the sight of a woman's fully bared
breast is immoral or creates a situation of immorality or disorder,
whereas the sight of a woman's breast with the nipple and areola
covered is something else entirely. Taken a step further, this implies
that a woman dancing in a bar, naked except for the aforementioned
accoutrements, is not immoral or indecent, yet a woman who removes
her shirt to enjoy a sunny day, is immoral or indecent. The activity
of dancing semi-naked in a bar involves the expression of, at the very
least, one idea, which is that the female breast is an object suitable for
viewing in the furtherance of male sexual gratification. The content
of this message is designed to arouse prurient interest; otherwise, it
is unlikely there would be an audience for it. By comparison, the
ideas expressed by topfree activism are of the the opposite opinion.
Topfree advocates believe that breasts are not objects; they are part
of subjects, women, who should be allowed to control when they are
seen, why they are seen, how they are seen, and by whom. Strippers
employ the unclothed female breast as a symbol of sexuality and
eroticism; advocates of topfree equality endeavor to demonstrate their

"' Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
8" Id

at 568-69.
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opposition to the use of the female breast as embodying these
concepts exclusively. Just as the traditional expressive content of the
American flag was challenged in Johnson v. Texas, so the Topfree

Seven challenged the traditional expressive content of the female
breast. Thus, there is a distinct inconsistency in protecting the
activity of erotic, semi-naked dancing, while denying that same
protection for appearing topfree in public, if public order and morality
are what is at stake.
InBarnes,Justice Rehnquist observed that state police powers
traditionally include regulations concerning public health, safety and
morals, and that such bases for legislation have been upheld. 3
(Presumably, then, had Santorellibeen heard by the Supreme Court
on First Amendment grounds, it would have failed, as did Barnes.) In
light of the expert testimony in Santorelli, which demonstrated
numerous ways in which keeping women's breasts covered creates a
range of social, psychological, and physical problems, particularly for
women,8 4 it is difficult to imagine how § 245.01 achieves public
health and safety. Public health and safety are not enhanced by a
discriminatory law which has numerous unhealthy effects for roughly
half of the population. Additionally, when comparing the activity of
topless dancing with the activity of topfree outdoor activity, it is not
difficult to ascertain which one is more likely to pose a threat to the
traditional concepts of morality and decency, despite the fact that the
former typically occurs indoors with only interested adults in
attendance, whereas the latter creates a situation whereby anyone may
observe the alleged offense.
An unstated assumption that may be reasonably extrapolated
from the legislative intent in § 245.01 is that women need to be
protected from harassment, assault or rape while appearing topfree.
Public order and women's safety would certainly be undermined if
they were unable to appear topfree without provoking unwanted male
sexual aggression. However, there are several problems with this
assumption. First, there is no evidence to suggest that any such

Ia at 569.
See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text
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aggression would necessarily occur as a response to topfree women.
Second, there are many contexts in which women are statistically
likely to be assaulted, injured, or killed, (notably in marriage or an
intimate relationship with a male) where women are allowed and even
encouraged to assume the risk. There are no laws preventing victhns
of domestic violence from returning to their abusive partners, and
women are not restrained from walking alone at night in high crime
areas. Thus, special protection is not needed nor is it useful in the
context of topfree equality. Additionally, the presumption of male
sexual aggression permits the inference that men are assumed to be
completely incapable of controlling their sexual response to the sight
of a bare female breast. It has not been demonstrated that this is the
case, and such an assumption serves to reinforce and justify the
traditional male role of sexual aggressor, and the stereotype of
potential rapist.
A corresponding unstated assumption that may be reasonably
inferred from the protection of public health, safety and morals is that
women who appear topfree are soliciting sexual attention from
strangers in an immoral way. This assumption has two major
weaknesses. First and foremost, women who appear topfree do not
necessarily want any attention from anyone, for any purpose.
Secondly, even if a woman who appears topfree is indeed attempting
to attract the attention of admirers, with perhaps intentions even
beyond acquiring their approving gaze, it has not been shown that
such activity is more damaging to public health, safety and morals
than wearing revealing or provocative attire. In fact, quite the
contrary has been demonstrated; keeping women's breasts just barely
covered may arouse even more interest, 85 and may lead to increased
risk of violence against women. 6 Thus, the unstated goal of
protecting morals and safety is merely part and parcel of protecting

ss See U.S. AToRNEY GENERAL's COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, The
Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 179-180 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 COMMISSION REPORT]; U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, Final Report 995 (1986).
86

id.
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the traditional representation and construction of the female breast as
sexual, as intimate, as "dirty."
Additional inconsistencies arise when one considers the facts
and issues in Santorelliin light of the current constitutional protection
for pornography. The standards which have been used for
determining when pornography is obscene, and therefore not
protected speech, are somewhat nebulous. In Roth v. U.S.' the Court
articulated this standard: "[W]hether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."88 Seven years
after Roth, Justice Stewart issued his well-known statement about
obscenity, "I know it when I see it." 9 A more refined definition was
later spelled out in Miller v. California:9'

Mhe basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
the "average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.91
Even a brief perusal of pornography which is not obscene
under this standard raises serious questions about what the court
meant by "community standards," "prurient," "patently offensive,"
and "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." However,
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354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at489.

8 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
90

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

9' I. at20.
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what is clear is that publishers of pornographic materials are given
considerable freedom under this standard. For private consumption
of commercially produced materials, one standard is used, whereas
for permissible public activity, another standard is applied. This
seems perfectly reasonable upon first glance; one can certainly
engage in all manner of sexual activity within the privacy of one's
home, including the consumption of pornography, which would be
well within the scope of a state's prohibition if undertaken in public.
However, the critical distinction is this: when a woman removes her
top at a beach or park, it is by no means a sexual act. Breasts are not
sexual organs, and have nothing to do with reproduction. 9 A woman
who has undergone a complete mastectomy may still have as many
children as she wishes, providing her reproductive system is
functioning. Thus, the female breast is not biologically defined as
sexual. The fact that the female breast may be encountered or
experienced in a sexual way does not define its nature; if this were
true, then many other body parts would certainly qualify as sexual.
When a woman removes her top in a natural, non-sexual
context, the expressive content of her actions is that her breasts are a
normal part of her body, suitable for exposure to public view without
running afoul of morality and decency. As long as pornography is in
existence, when a woman presents herself in a way that is overtly and
clearly contradictory to the expressive content of pornography, it is a
statement of a distinct political position that would likely be
understood by someone who witnessed the action. The government
interest in protecting public sensibilities loses ground in light of this.

I "Breast" as a noun has been defined as follows: "1.either of two
milk-secreting glands protruding from the upper front part of a woman's body 2.

a corresponding gland in a female primate 3. a corresponding undeveloped gland
in the male 4. figuratively, a source of nourishment 5. the upper, front part of the
body, between the shoulders, neck and abdomen 6. the part of a garment, etc.
that is over the breast 7. the breast regarded as the center of emotions 8.
anything likened to the breast." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICIONARY 174 (3d
college ed. 1976). By comparison, ScHMImD's ATrORNEY's DICrIONARY OF
MEDICINE defines "reproductive system" as "IThe organs and structures
concerned with the begetting or bearing of offspring ... In the female, the system
consists of the vagina, uterus, uterine tubes, and ovaries."
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Of particular relevance is the fact that the concealment of
women's breasts creates an obsessive fascination with them. Two
prominent studies on pornography demonstrated that when people are
repeatedly or continuously exposed to erotic material, they lose
interest in viewing the material and it ceases to produce sexual
arousal.93 Additionally, it has been shown that erotic material which
contains implied sexual activity and leaves more to the imagination
leads to higher levels of arousal than when material is explicit in
nature. 4 There is also evidence that concealment of women's breasts
may actually lead to increased violence against women.9' In light of
this evidence, it would seem that the public sensibility which is being
protected is one which serves to increase prurience, violence and
misperceptions about women, while simultaneously maintaining and
validating substantial risks to their health and safety.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Redefining the Female Breast
In Santorefi, the First Amendment protection which had been
granted at trial was denied on appeal in reliance upon People v.
Hollman.96 Defendant Robert Hollman was arrested twice under
§ 245.01 for sunbathing nude on a New York beach. A
self-proclaimed Naturist, Holiman maintained that his conduct
expressed his personal beliefs in the benefits of "open social

93

See 1970 COMMSSION REPoRT, supra note 85.

9

Id. at 170-72.

95 Id.at 242-43, 230-37 (studies showing that early social environments of
sex offenders are typically sexually repressive, intolerant of nudity, and laoking
discussion of sexuality and, that availability of erotic material is significantly
correlated to a decrease in sex offenses).

500 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1986).
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nudity.' 97 The court applied the O'Brien test and upheld his
convictions, finding that all four prongs of the test were satisfied. In
addressing the "constitutionality" prong, the court stated that public
nudity, even if it is expressive, (which in Hollman, the court found
that it wasnt) was well within the legitimate police powers of the
state. The requirements of the "legitimate interest" prong were
satisfied by the state's purpose to preserve the use of beaches for all
of its citizens, families included, to foreclose the possibility of
crowding and to preserve the character of the beach for its intended
use. The "content neutrality" prong was satisfied by the fact that the
statute prohibited displays of public nudity neutrally, without regard
to intent or purpose. Finally, the statute was narrowly tailored
because the prohibition of public nudity did not impair the
defendant's ability to advocate for the Naturist lifestyle through other
98
means.

Interestingly, the judge who wrote the unanimous opinion
opposing male public nudity in Hollman also wrote the concurrence
supporting topfree equality in Santorellia mere six years later. These
two cases define the differences between Naturism and topfree
equality. Naturism could be construed as encompassing topfree
equality, and therefore be subject to the same treatment under the law.
However, Naturism involves issues which toprfree activism does not
embrace, and does not address the particular problems raised by the
disparate treatment of males and females with regard to their breasts.
The distinctions between Naturism and topfree activism, discussed
below, show that Santorelli is not really about free speech or
complete public nudity. It is about breasts and how they are regarded
in late twentieth-century American popular culture. An equal
protection analysis is therefore not only appropriate, it is desirable in
that it draws attention to what is really guiding the predominantly

' ld. at 299. These benefits, as articulated by Hollman, include the
promotion of health, an increased awareness of human similarity, and the
creation of an alternative to puritanism on the one hand, and pornography on the
other.
9 Id. at301.
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male courts and New York State Legislature on this issue - their
inability to regard women as other than essentially and primarily
sexual, and their desire to keep it that way.
Both Naturists and topfree activists attempt to redefine what
have been traditionally regarded as sexual, and therefore private and
intimate, parts or areas of their bodies. However, Naturist men may
have great difficulty demonstrating that the public display of
traditionally private areas is not offensive for at least two reasons.
First, it will be difficult to conclusively establish that the public
display of male genitalia is not sexual, because of the fact that sexual
organs are just that, sexual organs, with the biologically primary
purpose of sexual reproduction. Second, in a society which has only
recently started to recognize the occurrence and the risk of rape and
sexual abuse, most.often perpetrated by males, it will be difficult to
advocate for the increased exposure of the body part which is often
central in such offenses.
By comparison, a woman who wishes to appear topfree
undertakes a different task than a male who wishes to appear
completely naked. In advocating topfree equality, a woman confronts
dominant cultural expectations and beliefs about the female breast in
terms of what it is for, what it should look like, who should be able
to see it and under what circumstances, and what seeing it means.
Topfree activists challenge a sociocultural construct which has
developed over hundreds of years in tandem with other equally
illogical and oppressive restrictions on acceptable female activity and
behavior. 9 The female breast as sexual creates a manner in which
women may be assaulted and offended in addition to outright rape
and harassment. Defining the breast as sexual establishes another
area of the female body which may be stared at, commented upon,
whistled at, or touched in an unwelcome manner which is more
offensive than if her elbow or shoulder received the unwelcome
contact. It creates another vulnerable area, another place which must
be protected, another way to be unsafe.

I Such restrictions include, for example, limitations on vocational choices,
voting, owning property, and participation in sports.
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Section 245.01 equates a woman's breasts with male genitalia
in their respective potential for offense due to public exposure.
However, the responses generated by each are substantially different.

A man who claims the right to appear undressed in public will, in all
likelihood, generate discomfort, cause offense and be subject to
sexual harassment charges, despite a lack of lewd or harassing
intent."° He is perceived immediately as an aggressor; he is
displaying the source of his power over women, the irrefutable
physical fact that he is a man, that he possesses the bodily parts

necessary to effectuate rape. 01 By comparison, when a woman
appears topfree in public she may cause similar discomfort or offense,
but she will not be perceived as an aggressor. On the contrary, she is
more likely to be the recipient of unsolicited prurient interest on the
part of male onlookers. She will be perceived as being available to
aggressive male sexual overtures,"° despite the fact that she may wish
to be left alone and disregarded completely. She may even be
"00 See Michalene Busico, Don'tLook, Ethel! Too Late: Berkeley Students
See Lots of the Naked Guy, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 6, 1992, at 35. A male
student at U.C. Berkeley, Andrew Martinez, (popularly known as "The Naked
Guy") was barred from the University because he attended classes naked. After
having attended class in that manner all semester, the University barred his
further entry to the campus, because his nudity was "disruptive." The University
took action after a number of female students filed sexual harassment charges
against Martinez. Martinez maintains that going naked was a form of speech
and that he was protesting against the sexually repressed traditions of Western
society. Id.
The defensive response to a naked male is not based on unfounded fears;
forty-four percent of women in the United States have been or will be victims of
rape or attempted rape at least once in their lives. DiANA E.-. RussEL, SEXUAL
ExPLOITAION 35 (1984). Additionally, one study indicated that one third of
American men surveyed said they would rape a woman if they were sure they
would not get caught. Neil M. Malamuth, Rape ProclivityAmong Males, 37 J.
Soc. ISSUES 138 (1981).
101

For example, at the first Topfree demonstration in 1986, when the women
removed their shirts, "they were surrounded by a mob of leering, catcalling
men." Jane and Michael Stem, Decent Exposure, NEV YORKER, Mar. 19, 1990,
at 74. In the following years, they refrained from alerting the press and police in
advance, to avoid such interactions. ld.
10"
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perceived as seductive or sexually provocative, even promiscuous,
inviting and seeking out the responses she receives.
B. Gender Discrimination
As stated earlier, the only claim advanced by the Topfree
Seven which was successful at trial was the First Amendment claim.
However, in light of the detailed and thorough strategies employed by
the demonstrators to ensure their message was clearly
communicated," it would be burdensome and impractical to require
that any female topfree activity be accompanied by such a barrage of
information. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides much better protection because it would
Also, topfree activists claim First
obviate such obstacles.
Amendment protection for expressing their right to equal protection;
if topfree activity received equal protection, it would not need the
First Amendment. As one of the defendants stated after the charges
were dropped in after trial on First Amendment grounds, "What we
have is a victory for us as individual women and a victory for free
speech, but a loss for women's rights."'0 4
New York Penal Law § 245.01 clearly creates a gender-based
classification. Regardless of the size or condition of their breasts,
men are permitted to go topfree wherever they like, not just parks or
beaches, and women are not. Some men have breasts that are
considerable in their dimensions, exceeding the breast size of many
females, and yet they may expose them to public view. By contrast,
a woman who is flat-chested, either by virtue of genetic
predisposition or surgery for cancer, must conceal her breasts. This
makes it quite clear that it is not the existence or condition of breasts

103 See

supratext accompanying notes 43-44.

i David Armon, Topfree Seven Say Judge 'Copped Out' on Sexism Issue,
UPI, Dec. 16, 1986, available in LFXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting
Nikki Craft).
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which determine their suitability for public view, but rather, the sex
of the breasts.
The standard which must be applied to any statutory
gender-based classification requires that the classification must serve
an important government objective and it must be substantially
related to the achievement of that objective. 5 The concurrence in
Santorellipointed out that while it is true that protection of public
sensibilities is a generally legitimate government objective, "it is a
tenuous basis for justifying a legislative classification that is based on
gender, race or any other grouping that is associated with a history of
social prejudice."'"I 6 Relying upon Mississippi Universityfor Women
v. Hogan,'07 the concurrence stated that the concept of "public
sensibilities" may be based upon popular misconceptions and biases,
and that "[o]ne of the most important purposes to be served by the
equal protection clause is to ensure that 'public sensibilities' grounded
in prejudice and unexamined stereotypes do not become enshrined as
part of the official policy of government."' 0' Judges Titone and
Simons went on to recognize the evidence offered by the defendants
to support their contentions: that breasts are not sexual organs, that
treatment of breasts as objects which arouse prurient interest is a
"suspect cultural artifact rooted in centuries of prejudice and bias
towards women," and that there are many parts of the world,
including areas of the United States, which accept the exposure of
female breasts in recreational areas as "commonplace" and
"unremarkable."109

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380(1979).
105

" People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 236.
101 458 U.S. 718 (1982). "[Glare must be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions." Id- at 725.
10I

People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E. 2d at 236.

109

Id. at 237.
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The protection of public sensibilities which was invoked by
both Judge Herman Walz and Judge John Connell in their refusals to
recognize equal protection for topfree activists rests on uncertain
ground. Judge Walz left it up to the Legislature to determine what
constitutes an intimate part of one's body, as reflective of community
standards, and in so doing, implicitly declined to write law from the
bench. What he failed to recognize, however, is that community

standards should not take precedence over constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Although it is not the intention of this comment to equate the
civil rights movement with efforts toward topfree equality, it is
significant to note that when Brown v. Board of Education'" was
decided, it did not exactly reflect community standards in many

locales.
It is also important to note that community standards are not
an immutable entity, especially regarding moral values and acceptable
behavior. Only one other state currently bans the mere exposure of
a womans breasts."' Twenty-two states restrict public exposure
statutes to the display of genitalia," and all but four, Indiana, New
Mexico, New York, and North Carolina require the showing of lewd

110347 U.S. 483 (1954).
...IND.

CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1984).

112 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41A60 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1970);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-302 (1964); IDAHO CODE § 18-4104 (1973 & Supp.
1994); IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4301(1984); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510-150 (Baldwin 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, § 854
(West 1967); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 566-130 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-504 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.806 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 645:1 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-14 (Michie 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-12.1 (1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1021 (1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163A65 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-45.1 (1990); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-24-1 (1977); TENN. CoDEANN. § 39-13.511 (1976); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.08 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-702 (1976); Wis. STAT. § 944.20
(1982).
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intent before imposing criminal sanctions for public exposure."' The
effect of these statutes is that in forty-eight states, women are granted
the equal protection under the law that they are denied in New York.
However, there are numerous municipal ordinances which have the
same practical effect as § 245.01, and the challenges
to these
114
ordinances have met with various degrees of success.
The rationales of the various courts which have considered
this issue do little to clarify the meaning of "public decency and
morality" or "public sensibilities." In holding that a woman's breasts
are not private parts, one court stated "Neither the legislature, by its
enactment of laws, nor the courts by interpretation thereof, can make
a man a gentleman nor a woman a lady - this molding must come
from other elements of society."115 This seems to indicate that the
judge considered being a lady or a gentleman a worthwhile aspiration
that may be achieved through, among other things, keeping breasts
covered. However, he declined to spell out why this is such a
worthwhile goal, let alone why it might be accomplished through
mandatory shirt-wearing. Yet another court, in upholding the
conviction of a woman who went topless in a National Wildlife
Refuge, opined:
Whatever the decline in the American public's
moral sensibilities might have been in the years since
[1957] (0 tempora, o mores!) it has not yet reached
the point where the body politic will recognize, as a
fundamental right of the human condition, the right to

't IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-14 (Michie
1969); N.Y. PENALLAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-190.9 (1984). North Carolina's statute outlaws exposure, but the judicial
construction has exempted female breasts. State v. Jones, 171 S.E.2d 468 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1970).

"4 See generally Richard B. KelIam and Teri Scott Lovelace, To Bare orNot
to Bare: The ConstitutionalityofLocal OrdinancesBanning Nude Sunbathing,

20 U. RicH. L. REv. 589 (1986).
"' State v. Jones, 171 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
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place in a state of partial or
go about in a public
116
nudity.
complete
This same opinion refers to the "community values" which
were at stake, as well as to the moral values of the community,
without explaining or exploring how unclothed female breasts are a
threat to those values. And in a truly remarkable New York opinion
which upheld the conviction of topfree picnic participants, the
underpinnings for the morality and decency of keeping women
covered was posited upon Judeo-Christian teachings, specifically,
Genesis." 7 These decisions highlight the unspoken, unwritten,
unquestioned values that exist just below the surface of contemporary
consciousness. The female breast as a sexual, intimate, private part
which must be kept covered is frequently awarded an immediate
facial validity which takes precedence over the factual reality of the
female breast.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the weak link
in the prohibition of topfree equality is the protection of public
sensibilities. What defines the female breast as sexual is society. (Of
course, it is difficult to pinpoint when or how the concept of the
female breast as sexual originated, but it is not difficult to ascertain
that it is currently in full force, as exemplified by pornography and
advertising.) The basic definition of the female breast as sexual has
grown into an almost obsessive cultural fixation on the breasts as the
epitome and apex of what it means to be female."' The type of breast
116

United States v. Biocic, 730 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (D. Md. 1990).

17

People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564,567 (Rochester City Ct. 1989).

"8 In 1990, The American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons
conducted a study of breast implant recipients and found that among women who
received implants for cosmetic reasons, 93% did so based on a desire for a more
proportionate build, 83% did so to achieve a more appealing appearance, and
76% did so to boost their self-confidence. The surgery surpassed these goals,
with 95% reporting that their bodies looked more proportional, 90% feeling
more appealing, and 81% stating they felt more confident. Thus, it is clear that
breast size has to do with feelings of personal worth. See NANCY BRUNING,
BREAsT IMPLANTS: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW 27-28 (1992).
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which sets the standard for what will be considered desirable has
changed over the years, but the point of focus has not. 9 The various
sizes of female breasts are even measured against the preferred size
and meanings are assigned to the variations. 2 ° The standard for
desirability that is used at any given point in time wil necessarily be

unattainable for a significant amount of women due to the natural
variety between women. As a result, women turn to surgery to
correct their perceived deficiencies, at considerable cost and risk,
because they simply have not been exposed to, are not aware of, and
therefore cannot accept or internalize the natural varieties of
12
breasts. '

Additionally, as discussed earlier, viewing the female breast
as sexual creates another manner in which women may be assaulted

and harassed. Taking all of this into consideration, it becomes clear
that forcing women to keep their breasts covered is unhealthy,
illogical and unconstitutional. Yet the tradition continues, reinforcing
the inferior societal status and passive social roles that that have been
assigned to, and in large part, accepted by, women.

"Over the years, the ideal figure for a woman has changed ...In this
century alone, we have seen rapid shifts from the Lillian Russell/Marilyn
Monroe standard, which was voluptuous and curvaceous, to the 1920s
Flapper/1960s Twiggy standard, which was unisex slim, to today's odd hybrid:
full-breasted and narrow hipped." CAROL TAVRIS, THE MIsMFASURE OF WOMEN
119

30(1992).
A recent study showed that women with large breasts were perceived as
unintelligent, incompetent, immoral and immodest, whereas women with small
bust sizes perceived as just the opposite. See Chris L. Kleinke and Richard
Staneski, FirstImpressions of FemaleBust Size, 110 L OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 123
1

(1980).
One author has recently posited the existence of a culturally created and
maintained "Official Breast" which cancels out all other breasts. NAOMI WOLF,
THE BEATrrYMYTH 248 (1991). Wolf further observes that the "Official Breast"
embodies and idealizes properties which symbolize the sexual ignorance and
infertility of adolescence, and that this is indicative of a culture which fears the
price of women's sexual self-confidence. Id.
12
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V. CONCLUSION
Since the Topfree Seven launched their attack on the
constitutionality of § 245.01, there has been extensive media
coverage, both locally and abroad,' which substantiates the
effectiveness of their actions in drawing attention to the issue, as well
as demonstrating its importance. However, included in the extensive
media coverage which was generated by the demonstration was an
article by columnist Ellen Goodman, who gave one of her annual
misogyny awards (given to those who have actively sought to slow
the progress of women) to the Topfree Seven.' The gravamen of her
accusation was that fighting for topfree equality trivializes women's
rights.
While it is true that being able to take off one's top at the
beach may be less important for most women than receiving equal
pay for equal work, being able to control reproductive decisions, or
freedom from violence and harassment, it is not a merely topical or
cosmetic right. Topfree equality is more than women being able to
do what men do; it is about women being able to do what they want,
when they want to. It is about women reclaiming their own bodies
and redefining them as something other than sexual objects existing
solely for the sexual arousal and gratification of males and the
marketing of consumer goods."
It is about women feeling
comfortable with and confident about their physical selves, enough
so that they no longer feel compelled to expend substantial amounts
of money and submit to unsafe surgical procedures to alter their

'" Defendant Mary Lou Schloss's Memorandum of Law in support of Motion
to Dismiss at 22, People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Rochester City Ct. 1986)
(No. CR-1527-86).
23

Ellen Goodman, Ms.-Anthropes, BOSTON GLoBE, Aug. 21, 1986 at 21.

Record at 237, 240, People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Rochester City
Ct. 1986) (No. CR-1527-86).
124
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bodies.2l5 Itis about encouraging and supporting mothers to be
comfortable enough to breast feed their children in public or private,
as recommended by the Surgeon General'26 and the American
Academy of Pediatrics. 27 And it is about eradicating the obsessive
fascination which perpetuates cultural myths about female breasts,
which, it has been suggested, contribute to the pervasive problems of
rape, domestic violence and sexual harassment.'2 As the people who
are most affected by the predominant perception of the female breast,
women should be allowed to effectively engage in the reformation
and redefinition of the female breast, and topfree advocacy should be
protected as speech and promoted as equality. This right should
extend beyond the narrow perimeters of parks and beaches, into our
streets and neighborhoods, into our everyday lives. If § 245.01 were
repealed tomorrow, it is safe to assume that women would not rush,
en masse, to exercise the right of topfree equality. This is due to the
extent to which they have internalized the myth of the obscene female
breast, as well as the response they would be likely to encounter.
Change comes slowly, sometimes one person at a time, and topfree
equality is unlikely to be any exception. But the change is an
important one, if we are ever to redress the pervasive and damaging
effects of the current cultural misperceptions regarding the female
breast.

12 See Cosmetic Surgery: The Priceof Beauty, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1992, at
25. Prior to the ban on silicone, breast implants were the most popular form of
cosmetic surgery, costing anywhere from $1,500 to $3,000. Approximately two
million American women have breast implants, half since 1983. Some husbands
and boyfriends even give them as gifts. Laura Shapiro, Karen Springen, and
Jeanne Gordon, What Is It With Women andBreasts, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1992,
at 57.
126 Record

at 449-52, People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Rochester City Ct.
1986) (No. CR-1527-86).
'27

See Breastfeeding, 62 PEDIATPICS, 597 (1979).
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See supratext accompanying notes 29-40.

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

VOL.MXV

VI. POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Court of
Appeals ruling in Santorelliwas tested in New York City. On two
occassions, Rosita Libre rode the New York Subway topfree. 129 The
Manhattan District Attorney's Office interpreted the Santorelli
decision as precluding Ms. Libre's prosecution for such activity. 3
Regardless, Mayor Giuliani directed the Transit Police to arrest
topfree women on the subways.'
The Transit Police therefore
created a policy that attempts to walk the perilously thin line between
the directives of the state's highest court and the city's mayor. Their
policy is to arrest topfree female subway riders only when they create
a "dangerous or disruptive situation in the subways.' 3 2 Apparently,
only unattractive women have the right to appear topfree on New
York City's subways. However, this is just the sort of incremental
advance that may well result in a time when we will wonder how
such inequality could have been tolerated, let alone socially accepted
and legally mandated.

'2

130

N.Y. T~fis, October 2, 1994, at B17.

rd

131 TId.

132 Id. A spokesman for the Transit Police elaborated by explaining that if a

"very, very attractive" topless woman was ascending out of a crowded station,
other subway riders may fall down the escalator or onto the tracks. Id.

